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PUBLIC PURPOSES FOR WHICH TAXATION IS
JUSTIFIABLE
It inheres in the very nature of a tax, which has been defined as
the enforced contribution from persons and property for the support
of government and for all public needs, that it shall be levied for a
public and not a private purpose. It has therefore come to be a
fundamental canon of the law of taxation, recognized and enforced
by the courts, that the tax be so levied for public purposes. It was
the Divine mandate that we'render unto Caesar the things which
were Caesar's. Our Caesar is the Public, and we therefore render to
the public the things that are the public's, that is, what rightfully
belongs to the public. Some State constitutions provide in express
terms that taxes shall only be levied for public purposes. But such
declarations are unnecessary, as the rule enforced by the courts
would be the same without them. Due process of law, which
requires that a tax shall be levied for a public as distinguished from
a private purpose, is now guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by the Federal Government against the exercise of State
authority.
The taxing power of Congress is limited to paying the debts,
providing for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States. The question over which there was so much animated
controversy in the past, as to whether the words, "general welfare,"
included not only the enumerated powers specified in the Constitu-
tion, but also whatever Congress might deem to be for the general
welfare, has now become academic rather than practical, in view
of the established doctrine that Congress has the right in the appro-
priation of the public funds to use its best judgment in the selection
of means which are adapted to the ends, provided the means are not
prohibited and the ends sought are within the scope of the Consti-
tution.
Thus the taxing powers of both Congress and the State Legisla-
tures are limited to public as distinguished from private purposes.
As the power of taxation is legislative and not judicial, the determi-
nation of what are public purposes for which taxes may be levied is
primarily a matter of determination by the legislature. But this
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legislative determination is not conclusive and is subject to judicial
review. The Supreme Court of the United States declared in Loan
Association v. Topeka, 2o Wallace 655, that while it was not easy
to decide what was a public purpose, and that the court was justified
in interposing only when the case was clear, affirmed in most posi-
tive terms this inherent and essential limitation o5 the taxing power.
This case involved the validity of a tax levied for the payment of
bonds in aid of manufacturers located in a Kansas town, and the
court declared that this was not a lawful public purpose. The diffi-
culty of laying down a general rule as to what is a public purpose
was recognized by the court in these words:
In deciding whether, in the given cash, the subject for which the taxes
are assessed falls upon the one side or the other of this line, they must be
governed mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for
which taxes have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied,
what objects or purposes have been considered necessary to the support and
for the proper use of the government, whether State or municipal. What-
ever lawfully pertains to this and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence
of the people may well be held to belong to the public use, and proper for
the maintenance of good government, though this may not be the only
criterion of rightful taxation.
But it was said that, in the case at bar, no line could be drawn in
favor of the manufacturer, which would not open the coffers of the
public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds of the business
men of the city or town.
While the legislative declaration that a tax levied for a public-
purpose is thus subject to judicial review, it is the universal ruling
that while the courts are justified in interposing only when it appears
that the Supreme law, which, governing both the legislature and the
judiciary, would be violated by the enforcement of the legislative
purpose.
Questions relating to the public purpose of taxation can seldom
be raised in regard to general levies for State taxes for State Pur-
poses, as such taxes are assessed and collected under general laws
wherein the specific objects for which taxes are to be expected are
not set forth and the courts cannot look behind the declared pur-
poses of the tax to ascertain the intent of the legislature as to the
appropriation of the proceeds of the tax. This is also true in Federal
taxation. Under the comprehensive revenue system of the govern-
ment, taxes are levied, not for specific purposes, but by continuing
laws establishing the rate of customs, duties and internal revenue
taxes. Questions relating to the lawful purposes of taxation, there-
fore, do not arise in the levying of Federal and State taxes, but in
the appropriation of public funds for public needs.
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Sometimes a tax may be levied for an ostensible public purpose,
as for public revenue, while the real purpose may be other than
revenue, and private purposes may then be subserved. Thus a tax
may be so excessive in amount as to destroy the interest of the busi-
ness upon which it is levied, by taxing it out of existence. The
tax upon the State bank notes was imposed by Congress for that
purpose so as to open the means for circulating the notes of the
National Banks. Duties on imports are sometimes levied, not for
the purpose of obtaining a revenue from the imports, but for the
purpose of excluding imports. Conceding that this is an abuse of
the taxing power, it is an abuse which, as a rule, cannot be remedied
by the judiciary. It was said by Chief Justice Marshall in McCul-
loch v. Maryland, that it is a perplexing inquiry, unfit for the judi-
ciary department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and
what degree may amount to an abuse of the power.
When public money has been collected under general or continu-
ing tax laws, as all State and Federal taxation, is as a rule collected,
the expenditure of such money is made through appropriations by
the legislative power, and it is seldom that the lawful exercise of this
power of appropriation can be judicially questioned. Thus the
validity of the bounty granted by Congress to the producers of sugar
in the Tariff Act of 189o was gravely doubted, as it was claimed
to be in effect an appropriation of the public funds to private use.
Such was the ruling of some of the State courts upon bounty legis-
lation. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, held
that arn apropriation by Congress to sugar manufacturers who had
produced and manufactured sugar upon the faith of this bounty
prior to its repeal was valid, United States v. Realty Company, 163
U. S. 427. The court said that the question was not whether the
original bounty was constitutional, which it declined to decide, but
whether Congress had a right to recognize claims founded upon
equitable and moral considerations; and that such claims constituted
"'debts" within the meaning of the Constitution.
Thus the United States, in the absence of express Constitutional
inhibition, may recognize the claims of equity and justice and may
recognize and pay obligations resting only upon moral considera-
tions; and it was said in this opinion that upon this general principle
the Federal Congress stands upon a level with the State legisla-
tures. An eminent authority, Justice Cooley of the Supreme Court
of Michigan, in People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, said that in deter-
mining the objects of a State expenditure, a wise statesmanship is
not confined to expenditures that are absolutely needful to continue
the existence of the government; but it may include those which
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may tend to make the government subserve the general well-being
of society and advance the prospective happiness and prosperity of
the people.
Questions relating to the lawful purpose of taxation can, as a
rule, therefore, only be raised in the courts when a tax is levied
for a specific declared purpose. Such a case was presented in Mis-
souri a few years ago and involved the determination of what was a
lawful public purpose in the promotion of higher education. A tax
was levied upon inheritances and other subjects, the proceeds
whereof were to be applied in defraying the expenses at the State
University of students without means, who should be awarded
scholarships of merit through competitive examinations. This
was held by the Supreme Court of the State to be invalid, State
ex tel. v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287, as involving a tax for private per-
sons, not for a public purpose. The Constitution of the State of
Missouri directs the maintenance of a State University, and it was
urged upon the court that as scholarships were a recognized and
historic incident of university endowment, this method of maintain-
ing the university and making it serviceable in the education of the
talent of the State, was within the discretion of the legislature,
which could not be reviewed by the courts. It is difficult to see any
-difference in principle between building dormitories for students
to live in and paying professors to teach them, and endowing scholar-
ships so that deserving students without means can have the benefit
of instruction. This case is illustrative of the intensely conservative
position of some courts in recognizing that on this subject the law
is a developing science. The standard of public opinion of one gen-
eration as to the proper limits of public education at public expense
is not that of another. It is interesting to note that Mr. Jefferson
in the founding of the University of Virginia suggested the selec-
tion from the elementary schools of subjects of the most promising
genius, whose parents were too poor to give them further education,
to be carried on at public expense through colleges and universities.
(See letter to Mr. Carrear of November 25th, 1817, 7 Jefferson's
Complete Works, p. 93.)
While some of the State Constitutions provide expressly that
taxes shall only be levied for public purposes, which, as before stated,
the law would imply without such declaration, only two of them, as
I find, contain any specification of what constitutes a lawful public
purpose. These States are, Louisiana and Georgia, and both of
these include the pensioning of disabled Confederate soldiers and
their widows and orphans as lawful subjects of taxation, and the
former includes also the establishment of monuments upon the bat-
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tlefields commemorated by the services of soldiers from the State
on such fields. With these exceptions the question of what is a
lawful public purpose is left by our Constitutions to be determined
by the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion.
Questions as to' the lawful purposes of taxation have been fre-
quently raised, however, in local and municipal taxation. Here
there is no such difficulty of procedure in reviewing the legislative
discretion as there is in regard to general levies by Congress and
the State legislatures, and it is a local and municipal taxation that
we have the greatest pressure for extended governmental activity
involving the exercise of the taxing power. We find numerous
cases both in the State and Federal courts involving the question
of what is a lawful public purpose in statutes authorizing municipal
taxation. Thus a statute authorizing the issue of municipal bonds
for the purchase of seed corn to be given to farmers after a crop
failure was held invalid in Kansas. State v. Osawkee Township, 14
Kans. 418; but a similar statute was held valid in North Dakota v.
Lenson County, I No. Dak. 188. The development of our juris-
prudence was illustrated in the latter decision, which, in referring
to the former decision, said: "In our view it is not certain or even
probable in the light of subsequent experience in the West, that the
court of last resort of the State of Kansas would enunciate the doc-
trine of that case at the present day. The decision was made fifteen-
years ago. While the fundamental principles which underlie legis-
lation and taxation have not changed in the interval, it is also true
that the development of the Western States has been attended with
difficulties and adverse conditions, which have made it necessary
to broaden the application of fundamental principles to meet the
new necessities of those States. . . . It is the boast of the com-
mon law that it is elastic and can be adjusted to the development of
new social and business conditions."
The proper limits of this paper will not permit an extended
review of the numerous decisions of the State and Federal Courts
on this subject of the lawful public purpose of taxation irrespective
of charter restrictions. Thus there has been much litigation over
the extension of municipal boundaries and the taxation of annexed
suburban property for municipal purposes. The aid of railroads
has been held to be a lawful public purpose in the absence of con-
stitutional restrictions, while the promotion of private business enter-
prise, though incidentally of public benefit, have been held not to be
a lawful public use. Thus, in a recent decision, the United States
Court of Appeals of this Circuit held that public sorgum mills were
not a lawful public purpose of taxation, Dodge v. Mission Township,
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46 C. C. A. 6i. The court in this case distinguished the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Burlington Township
v. Beasley, 94 U. S. 3IO, which sustained municipal bonds for the
erection of custom grist mills, and said that that decision was the
outgrowth of a more primitive state of society where there were no
railroads and few good highways and where custom grist mills in
the immediate neighborhoods of productive fields to grind grain for
bread for the people and food for the cattle, were a public necessity.
On the other hand, it has been held that the promotion of patriotism
by public memorials and public expositions are so promotive of the
general welfare as to be a lawful subject of taxation.
The State of Massachusetts has furnished a number of recent
illustrations of the development of the law upon this subject and
its close association with the growth of public opinion. Thus, in
that State it was held that a municipality could be authorized to
build a memorial to the memory of the soldiers and sailors of the
Civil War, but that such a building could not be used in part by a
Post of the Grand Army of the Republic. Kingman v. Brocton, 153
Mass. 255. The justices of the Supreme Court in that State advised
the legislature under a provision of the State Constitution authoriz-
ing the justices to be interrogated as to the lawful powers of the
legislature, that cities and towns could be authorized to manufacture
gas and electricity for use in their public streets and buildings, and
for sale to the inhabitants. Opinion of Justices, 15o Mass. 593, and
155 Mass. 598. Btit subsequently the justices were asked the fur-
ther question whether power could be conferred by the legislature
upon cities and towns to buy and sell coal and wood for fuel for
their inhabitants. Five out of seven justices said that such a power
could not be lawfully conferred; that the Constitution did not con-
template this as one of the ends for which the government was estab-
lished, and that they must go back to the time when the Constitu-
tion was adopted to determine its construction as to the proper
limits -bf governmental activity. Justice Holmes, however, of that
court, who is now of the Supreme Court of the United States, dis-
sented, holding that the question was purely one of legislative dis-
cretion and that the purpose was no less public, when the article
was wood or coal, than when it was water or gas or electricity or
education, to say nothing of cases like the support of paupers or
the taking of lands for railroads or public markets.
The scope of governmental activity in a great modern city is
necessarily vastly greater than it was in the comparatively small
municipal communities when the Federal Constitution was adopted.
Public education as a training of citizenship, the preservation of the
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public health through public sewers, public parks and boulevards
and even public baths, and the scientific treatment of the removal
of garbage and the prevention of contagion, have involved a vast
extension of governmental powers with an enormous increase of the
burden of taxation. Public opinion recognizes and endorses this
extension as necessitated by the changed conditions of our times.
But apart from this there is a new and distinct demand for a
great enlargement of the scope of governmental activities through
an assumption by the public of what have heretofore been distinctly
private enterprises; that is, a substitution of public for private own-
ership. As to some of these, it must be admitted there is no distinct
line of principle for determining of what shall be public and what
private. Some cities in our countries have public water works,
others have private. Some have public lighting, others private.
Public libraries and public museums are now becoming recognized
as a branch of public education, when they were practically unknown
a generation ago. Thus, in Great Britain, the telegraph is owned
by the public, conducted as the post-office is in this country; while
in some of the continental countries the railroads are owned by the
State. In some of the cities of Great Britain as well as on the con-
tinent, street railroads are owned and operated by the public. On
the continent of Europe it is recognized that public support of
amusements is a legitimate public function. In one or more States
of this country the sale of liquor has been put under distinct public
ownership and management.
It is not within the scope of this paper to comment upon the
wisdom of these extensions of governmental activities. It is suffi-
cient to point out that there is no department of the law where its
intimate association with, and its dependence upon the development
of opinion are more obvious than in this question of the requirement
of a public purpose of taxation. Our system of jurisprudence is
based upon the doctrine of judicial precedent. Ours is a land as
was our mother country where "freedom broadens slowly down
from precedent to precedent." Our courts in drawing the line
between what is public and what is private in taxation and govern-
mental expenditure, necessarily look to what is sanctioned by time
and the acquiescence of the people. Thus the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in the case cited, in denying the power of legislature
to authorize towns to go into the business of buying and selling
fuel, looked back several generations to determine what was the
limit of government activity at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution. But on this subject more than on any other we must
recognize that the law is a developing science. It must progress as
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civilization itself progresses, and the judicial view must tend to
harmonize with the prevailing and controlling enlightened public
opinion. Who can predict the public opinion of the next genera-
tion as to the limits of governmental activity? In this sense the
words of Mr. Lowell become profoundly significant: "Our written
constitutions are an obstacle to the whim, but not to the will of the
people." Frederick N. Judson.
St. Louis.
